Three steps in the
demise of deconstruction
Ewan Morrison
Deconstruction has been around for
a long time. It is the buzzword which encapsulates a legacy of shared opinions
and assumptions about our culture. Nobody any longer needs to be told what
it means, deconstruction is a daily activity, to ask what deconstruction
is, as Derrida told us, is to make unreasonable demands of the deconstructive
project, is to posit essence where there is deferral, to look for truth
where there is a play of meanings.
Contemporary art practice is unimaginable
without deconstruction. So called Neo-conceptualist art is a distillation
of deconstructive method, and the status afforded neo-conceptualists within
state institutions such as the Tate gallery is a testament to the growing
status of deconstruction as a now recognised method. Artists who use deconstructive
methods such as Douglas Gordon and Christine Borland, and their recognition
through the Turner prize, point to the common acceptability of this practice.
Not only is its influence widespread
within art practice but also within art education. Since the mid 80's its
position has grown within the UK's art institutions, through the status
afforded to it as the legitimate opposition to the dominant conservative
hierarchies. Glasgow School of Art, The Slade and Goldsmiths are names
synonymous with the 'infiltration' of deconstructive theory and indeed
the high status of these institutions now is testament to certain victories
in its history. Students who were the first generation to absorb deconstructive
theory are now working within those institutions, Borland and Gordon now
lecture and work on assessment periodically within the Glasgow School of
Art. It is not an exaggeration to speak of a second generation of deconstructionists,
and of deconstruction as a now institutionally recognised practice. One
could even claim that it is impossible to make art in the 90's without
a firm grasp of the basic tenets of deconstructive method.
As the method reaches maturity,
however, we are at a transitional point in time where deconstruction is
no longer the opposition but the dominant practice. It is possible at this
point to conceive of an entire generation of young artists who are engaged
in deconstruction, without being aware of the theoretical concerns upon
which their method is based. A generation for whom, deconstruction needs
no justification or critique. The danger here is that deconstruction becomes
a style, a routine or system, an unquestioning and self reflexive exercise:
What is at stake is the redundancy of the method itself. It is at this
point that we are forced to question what claims are being made in the
name of deconstruction. A revision is due, or it would be, if only deconstruction
could or would allow such a revision to take place. In many ways deconstructive
practice has placed itself beyond criticism and as a result has become
reduced to a set of formula and truisms which inevitably compromise or
undermine its entire project. As such the need to chart possible grounds
from which such a critique might occur is urgent.
The ubiquity of deconstructive method
can be shown by looking at the common connections between a number of artists
work. There could be said to be a basic model or schema which artists use
which is both rigid and homogeneous--a "three step guide" to making a deconstructive
artwork which is commonly used and accepted. The following discussion centres
around three artworks by three artists, and is an attempt to, through their
work, situate a critique of deconstruction.
Three artworks three artists
Christine Borland L'homme Double
Lisson Gallery, London
Jeremy Deller The Uses of Literacy
CCA, Glasgow
Kerri Scharlin Diary
Wooster Gardens, New York
These three artists have each been
situated in previous writings within the frame of reference of deconstruction,
and their work has been critiqued using the deconstructive vocabulary.
Whether this influence is within the artists' work or within the reading
of their work is of little consequence. The following model could equally
well be applied to many of their contemporaries whose work exists through
'deconstructive readings'.
The schema or 'deconstructive equation'
proposed here has been culled from a number of secondary sources most specifically
Against Deconstruction by John. M.Ellis. As any supporters of deconstructive
theory will know the following attempt to characterise a method for deconstructive
practise in art, runs counter to, the spirit of deconstruction itself.
The arguement being that deconstruction is 'descriptive and analytical,
not prescriptive or programmatic'1.
I would argue however that the use of deconstruction in art has become
programmatic, and at that this point it is necessary to clarify what the
terms of that programme are. The following schema is intended, not to reduce
each artists' work to a single reading, but to show the ways in which their
work is already based upon an existant theoretical model.
The deconstructive equation:
one method in three stages
Before a deconstructive project
can be inititated 'the artist' (author) must be removed to divest the creative
act of the illusion of authenticity, and to question the status of the
artist as metaphysical originator of meaning. Any possibility of the artist
'making a statement' or of 'self expression' must be denied. The artists
role is shifted then towards that of curator and fascilitator. Thus the
use of other people to make the work on the behalf of the artist. The artist
formulates the equation, and supervises its execution. The artwork is the
gradual working through of the elements that the equation has set in motion
and the presentation of the results.
The first step is to find a dominant
term. This could be a respected tradition of representation, a concrete
identity, a metaphysical assertion, or a claim to truth. e.g. The artist,
objectivity, the original artefact.
The second step is to set it up
against its opposite, e.g. the non-artist, subjectivity, the fake. Thus
the traditional binary opposition between two terms has been set up: Good/evil,
form/content, inside/outside, objectivity/subjectivity.
These first two steps are essentially
the same as that used in traditional metaphysics however it is the third
steps that characterises the deconstructive shift.
The third step is to swap the order
of the terms, to reverse the supremacy of the first term with the second,
to show that they are mutually dependent upon the other for their meaning.
This is usually done by placing the second term within the same context
as the first term, from which it is necessarily excluded. Thus in Glas,
Derrida, set Hegel and Genet side by side and let the two texts infect
and disrupt each other. And in Duchamp, the ready made is placed within
the context of the gallery.
Thus the authority, and autonomy,
of either opposite is deconstructed. The two terms are seen as being mutually
dependent on each other for their self definition. The possibility of any
'originary' meaning, or of true presense is rendered 'problematic'. Everything
becomes relative.
Within a successful work, the two
terms will cancel each other out in a mutual self referencing. Thus all
traditional oppositions are destabilised: good/bad, black/white, male/female,
original/fake. The final outcome is a destabilised text (or work) which
takes no sides in the equation which it has set up and which will ambiguously
float between meanings. It will be 'undecided', 'unfixed'. The unfixing
of these terms, it is claimed, is the unfixing of the metaphysics of opposition,
the destabilising of heirarchy. The destabilising of hierarchy has been
seen by many critics as being a politicised project, it follows then that
work which uses deconstructive method has been variously described as:
'radical', 'subversive', 'strategic' and 'challenging'.
Applying the method: 3 Examples
1. Jeremy Deller The uses of
literacy
The uses of literacy is a work by
Deller which takes as its source the 'artwork' of fans of Manic Street
Preachers. In the deconstructive schema he takes as his first term 'art'
and his second term 'pop culture'.
The work is a collation of drawings,
poems, and dedications to the Manic Street Preachers which the artist has
'curated' and also includes documentation of the artist's correspondences
to fans. The Manic Street Preachers are themselves of little importance
to the artwork and are no more than a ruse, for Deller's highly effective
deconstruction of 'personal expression'. Deller does not express himself,
but sets the mechanism in motion that will deconstruct personal expression
by itself. By choosing to curate the works of other 'amateur' artists he
has already set up an opposition to the notion of the professional artist.
and has reversed the hierarchical order of the terms by placing the amateur
art within the gallery.
By showing amateur drawings and
poems by fans of the band, Deller on the one hand deconstructs the idea
of the authenticity of the professional artist. This device doubles back
on itself when the 'authenticity' of the pop culture which is opposed to
high art turns out to be little more than imitative: Most of the fans drawings
are copies taken from the pages of magazines and fanzines. This act of
copying undermines the authenticity of the sentiments expressed. This is
cross referenced by the fact that the Manic Street Preachers are themselves
the self proclaimed "fans band"--their own originality is placed in question.
In the work all 'personal expression' refers back to something else, is
rendered relative, and hence inauthentic.
The bookshelf of one fan is also
exhibited, showing a predictable assortment of the tomes of teenage enlightenment,
Catcher in the Rye, Ecce Homo, Nausea. The angst of the suffering existential
hero, is viewed in the light of adolescant hero worship. The philosophy
of individualism is laid bare. The expressive is suddenly seen as being
a fallacy. The artist, the human subject, is no more original than a posturing
pop star.
Through their art the fans yearning
for real experience is apparent, but their reliance on copying reveals
the poverty of their own imaginations and the impossibility of transcendence.
Their idols are a copy, of a copy of a copy, and their acts of self expression
are copies also. However while 'authenticity' may be discredited, the feelings
aroused by the yearning for authenticity, cannot be discounted. Unlike
many deconstructive artists there is the possibility that Deller appreciates
the dilemma of his subjects.What Derrida termed:
"The saddened, nostalgic guilty
response which dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes
play and the order of the sign."2
Deller exhibits the fans longing
for authentic experience without participating in it. A gesture which can
be read as either one of empathy or of detached condesension. This is not
however just a formal exercise in pure method, the sense of homage in the
work by the fans and perhaps even by the artist imbues the deconstructive
act with a sense of loss. An ironic nostalgia for the very things that
the work itself undoes.
2. Kerri Scharlin
In Diary American artist Kerri Scharlin
takes the persona of the artist as her first term and the celebrity as
the second. As with Deller, Sharlin has employed other people to make the
work for her. In this instance Hollywood scriptwriters have been hired
to write a fictionalised account of a trip she made to LA, and professional
actresses to act out the role of herself: 'the artist'. The scripts are
exhibited, along with the video taped auditions by the actresses.
Scharlin's work like Deller's sets
up an opposition between the 'real' and the 'fake', between the individuality
of the artist, and fabricated identity of the celebrity. The persona of
the artist is split up into representations which have been transformed,
misinterpreted and reinterpreted through an impersonal communications industry,
(TV script writing, casting and acting). The original persona of the artist
is lost, and we can only begin to doubt whether or not it ever existed.
The two terms, artist and celebrity,
are reversed, both are thrown into question. This seems at once a critique
of the status of artist as celebrity, and at the same time a complete undermining
of any possibility of a true artistic statement. Traditionally we conceive
of the integrity of the artist as being compromised by the media. Scharlin
has reversed this hierarchy and so deliberately constructed an exercise
in complicity which destroys any notion of true, original meaning, and
hence of integrity. There can be no compromise because there is no authenticity.
One can read the work as a critique of the commercialisation of contemprary
art practice, only at one's own expense as Scharlin undermines the possibility
of a valid artistic project or an un-mediated critical space. The ambivallence
of the gesture sits uncomfortably as the difference between corporate media
and contemporary art is abolished with so slick a slight of hand. If any
irony is intended it is lost as Scharlin's use of deconstruction is so
well honed that she undermines the possibility of any artistic project
other than deconstruction itself.
Scharlin's deconstruction ends up
lapsing into what Hal Foster termed "the duplicity of cynical reason" where
a radical critique of the role of the artist is seen to be taking place,
while the status of art is re-instated as "deconstructive art". With Scharlin
there is no sense of the problem posed by deconstruction, the loss of critical
perspective. Instead there is the proffessional illustration of deconstruction
as a positive project in itself. Ambivallence as a message. Duplicity as
the truth of our time.
3. Christine Borland
Christine Borland's L'Homme Double,
is commonly perceived to be a deconstructive artwork. An Artwork which
questions the nature of representation, truth and presense, an artwork
which focuses on "the forms and machineries of interpretation themselves."3 In L'Homme Double,
Borland toohas contracted other 'professionals' to make the physical elements
of the work for her. She employed six sculptors from different technical
backgrounds to make portrait busts of Nazi scientist Josef Mengele, from
a pair of photographs and a set of contradictory descriptions. The resulting
sculptural busts were displayed alongside the documentation and letters
of invitation.
Borland has used 'the original'
as her first term, and taken 'the reconstruction' as her second. She has
set the notion original and authentic identity against interpretation,
and set expression through material in sculpture, against the notion of
objective reconstruction.
In deconstructive procedure the
terms are reversible, thus we can also read from Borland's work the notion
that objectivity cannot completely divest itself of creativity, that its
objectivity is in fact infected with vestiges of creative interpretation,
and is therefore flawed. The six busts do not and cannot show Mengele as
he really was.
The form has resonances with the
content as we find that the notion of 'copies from an original' has associations
with cloning, and the scientific experiments which Mengele was involved
in during his life. The fact that each copy is different, goes some way
towards, poetically, disproving some of the so called 'scientific' theories
upon which Mengele's experiments were based. Metaphorically, each bust
is a failed clone. An injection of difference at the heat of a fascistic
closed system.
L'Homme Double throws up the heartening
thought that although the author is dead, and there is no such thing as
innate creativity or self expression, we are all in some way different--there
is something which escapes systems of understanding--and herein lies our
freedom.
As the death of the author gave
rise to the birth of the reader, so too the death of the artist gave rise
to the birth of the viewer. That 'something' which escapes in this deconstruction
of identity, is none other than the viewer's subjectivity--the possible
multiplicity of interpretation, the sheer benevolent magnitude of pluralism.
As Borland has said in interview, she hopes that the work "asks a million
questions about the human condition."
Thus the death of the author is
conflated with a critique of hierarchical power structures. A typical deconstructive
side shift which associates self expression and representation (metaphorically)
with fascistic structures. All attempts at tying down meaning are seen
as logocentric, and thus inherently hierarchical and oppressive. This destruction
of the singular truth through the multiplicity of interpretation takes
on political meaning in the context of the political persuasion of those
who in this instance saught to enforce their truth.
L'Homme Double can be read as an
anti-fascist work. According to deconstructive theory it could and should
also be able to be read as a pro-fascist work: as both left and right and
neither left nor right. But how can we interpret the role of deconstructive
ambiguity in the context of an issue as important as fascism? In reading
L'homme Double we can say that the work problematises a politics of binary
opposition, or conversely that it is irresponsibly ambivalent in its politic.
What could it possibly mean to say that both readings in this case are
equally valid? Does Borland's work here not point to a problem within deconstructive
theory? Borland's work is interesting here in that there is something questionable
in her use of deconstructive method. In addressing such a loaded subjects
as cloning and fascism, Borland has 'cheated' the ways in which the artwork
can be interpreted. She has not allowed the deconstructive equation to
operate unhindered. She has stacked the odds against a particular set of
readings which she does not want viewers to make.
As has already been pointed out
by David Barret,4 Borland
has given her own game away in her letters to the invited sculptors by
stating "this information and these photographs can be interpreted as freely
as you wish". The work would have been more academically correct in deconstructive
terms if 'objectivity' had been required: allowing the incongruous and
contradictory interruption of multiple objectivities to deconstruct the
notion of singular and universal objectivity.
Borland's attempts to rig the results
are an attempt to smooth over the ethical issues which surround the work.
She has made each of the sculptors come up with a different Mengele. In
so doing they 'un-do' the presence of the real person, they disperse Mengele
though representations of Mengele. The work shows that there is no such
thing as 'real' or true identity, true identity is equated with fascism,
with the search for the defining Aryan specimen. Instead of fixed identity,
we have the free play of interpretations. The work, through its method,
shows that deferral of identity can be used as a weapon against those who
would define and confine meaning, enforce a single truth.
It is interesting here to speculate
on Borland's intent in her 'cheated' use of deconstruction. Could it be
that she never wanted to risk the possibility of her sculptors delivering
similar busts and hence creating a singular objective representation of
Mengele? If she had, as in previous work, employed exclusively forensic
sculptors, this might have been the end result. She had instead stacked
the odds in favour of multiple interpretations. Had she not done this the
work would have had very different associations. The deconstructive equation
could had yielded something approximating a single true image of Mengele.
Thus identity would be fixed, Mengele's bust would become a representation
of 'evil' and we would end up reading the man's ethics from his physiogamy.
This is exactly what Mengele himself did.
We can only assume that Borland
was aware of the dangers of this posible outcome. Her 'cheating' is then
understandable. This cheating with deconstructive method however throws
up some very important questions about the assumptions that exponents of
deconstructive practice hold on the implicit politics of deconstruction.
Deconstruction and the problem
of value judgement
In his book, Against Deconstruction
John.M. Ellis points out what he sees as the "heavy emphasis on moral terminology"
in deconstructive discourse.
Deconstruction is described as "disturbing",
"disruptive", it "unmasks", "subverts", "dismantles", "exposes" and "challenges".5
This observation seems at first
seems inaccurate. Are not these words deliberately used within deconstructive
discourse precisely to question the moral certainties of any one fixed
position. Is not the whole deconstructive enterprise based upon throwing
the certitude of the oppositions good/bad, right/wrong, into question,
of rendering them 'problematic'? Are words such as 'subverts' and 'challenges'
not used precisely because they are ambiguous enough to avoid being fixed
to one position.
But Ellis' point has validity. These
particular words are both emotive and imply a politic, they have a history,
a tone. It is undeniable that there is a set of value judgements behind
the choice of these words. But where could this 'moral tone' possibly come
from if there is no possible ground for 'moral codes' within deconstruction?
From what ground is the 'subversion' or the 'challenge' coming from? Certainly
not from the left or the right, or from a humanist base.
"The main weight of Derrida's idea
lies very much in their being an antidote to logocentrism. Its positive
aspect derives from the thing that it sets itself up against."6
Deconstruction cannot claim to have
a grounded position, however it is often assumed by its exponents that
the hierarchies it undoes tend to be rigid right wing authoritative structures.
There is an inference then that deconstruction is inherently radical and
inherently of value to the left. In doing deconstruction one undoes the
opponent through subjecting them to the destabilising influence of relativism,
one un-does the right through being pluralist.
It is from this use of relativism,
that the (implicit) moral tone that Ellis pinpointed arises. Deconstruction
expounds the questioning of all fixed values. Multiplicity, ambiguity,
and ambivallence, were initially used as tools, but when they soldify into
a project and become self justifying exercises the project of deconstruction
then inevitably becomes relativism for its own sake.
There is however a name for relativism
elevated to the status of a moral imperative. It is otherwise known as
liberalism. It becomes apparent then that the 'subversive', 'challenging'
nature of deconstruction arises from nothing more radical than liberal
pluralism.
The deconstructive dictum that all
interpretation is misinterpretation, that meaning cannot be tied down,
fits very comfortably with the liberal belief that 'every interpretation
is valid'. The now commonly accepted claim that meaning is relative, and
that there are 'as many interpretations of a work as their are viewers'
inevitably results in a situation where value judgements become entirely
relative, and tolerance of plurality, acceptance and encouragement of other
readings, becomes elevated to the status of a moral imperative.
The danger here is that under the
sheer magnitude of multiple interpretations, every reading becomes equally
valid. Not only can no singular reading be seen as any more valid than
any other, but any singular reading becomes criticised for its lack of
pluralism, its 'closure'. Inevitably under such conditions any value judgement
at all becomes impossible. This problem with deconstructive reading is
the same contradiction which lies at the heart of liberalism. Liberalism
expounds a moral relativism which:
"...gives a special support to toleration
as a moral attitude to codes which diverge from one's own. Paradoxically
however, if that were accepted as a universal (and universally morally
approvable) attitude, it would contradict the relativism which disallows
any authorative principles."7
Herein lies the contradiction which
upsets deconstruction. There is an implicit agenda behind the use of the
deconstructive vocabulary--an agenda which cannot admit to itself without
undermining the entire deconstructive project. As soon as it can be shown
that deconstruction operates from a fixed position, or requires grounded
values, that cannot by definition be deconstructed then deconstruction
collapses. Deconstruction then is caught in the same impasse as liberalism:
The inability to tolerate any system that has fixed values, the inability
to tolerate anything other than itself, the inability to confront its own
groundlessness and its inevitable expounding of its groundlessness as its
positive aspect.
Relativism can be useful as a tool
for destabilising hierarchies and established power structures, but when
it becomes a self-justifying project in itself, an end in itself, its lack
of any founding values makes its operation questionable. Deconstruction,
as we know, is not tied to a project, and can be used to undermine the
left as well as the right. It is after all just as easy to deconstruct
moral codes as it is oppressive hierarchical structures.
By inference a leftist bias is read
into L'Homme Double, simply by the fact that it sets itself up against
the right. There is however no guarantee of this reading of the work, and
as with all deconstructive method it could easily have doubled back on
itself.
As an experiment in deconstruction,
L'Homme Double could have gone terribly wrong. Without the request to the
sculptors to interpret "as freely as you wish", we may have seen six heads
of Mengele, which were horribly similar. Given the possibility of the sculptors
doing their own research on a larger archive, we may have ended up with
something approximating the real presence of a real person. If this had
been the case then, the results would have been very different, and the
'uncommon handsomeness' of Mengele captured in sculptural form could have
had disastrous implications. We could have had: the fetishism of pure (Aryan)
form, the nostalgic longing for origin and essence read through national
identity, worse still, the reading of individual character traits through
facial structure ( a now condemned pseudo science once practised by Mengele
himself). Even more questionable would be the opening up of a very specific
moment of history, to a multiplicity of interpretations, in short to revisionism,
with all of its attendant right wing connotations. Can we question that
the Nazi's were wrong? What does it mean to deconstruct the opposition
right/wrong in the context of fascism.
In rigging the results, Borland
has exposed her own distrust of deconstructive method and revealled her
own leftist agenda. As such she points out that there is something dangerously
missing in deconstructive method proper.
Borland wants it both ways. She
wants to give the impression of remaining open to interpretation, and at
the same time she wants the moral certainty of ensuring that no-one reads
the work as a valorisation of fascism. This contradiction is unresolvable.
This is not to accuse Borland of misunderstanding deconstructive method.
On the contrary her loading of the odds in favour of a particular reading
pinpoints a need for 'correction' in deconstructive theory. A correction
which nonetheless undermines the theory entirely. Her courage or foolhardiness
in tackling such a loaded subject pinpoints the blind spot at which deconstruction
ceases to function effectively. That blind spot is: its inability to deal
with ethical questions.
It is around the issue of ethics
that Deconstruction derails itself, or rather it is around the issue of
ethics that deconstruction always retracts, backtracks and obfuscates its
own movements. For, to acknowledge the existence of ethics at all would
undermine the anti-ontological impulse of deconstruction. How can a set
of grounded values possibly exist, if all values are in play. When we start
to deconstruct question of ethics, we find ourselves really getting into
trouble--A relativist ethics--how could this be possible? If we accept, and
expound, relativism in ethics then we can draw the inevitable Nietzschean
conclusion that moral values are determined by those with power and that
this is both inevitable and acceptable.
Attacks on deconstruction are usually
dismissed as being either 'reductive' or 'distorting'. The accusation being
that the critic has reduced deconstruction to an ontological statement,
to a set of truisms or claims to truth. The common reaction being 'to ask
what is...of deconstruction' is to perpetuate a system based upon the notion
of presence. To attempt a critique from outside of the terrain of deconstruction
leads immediately to the above accusations--deconstruction just does not
recognise the legitimacy of conventional logic.
To attempt a critique of deconstruction
from within, is equally impossible as any attempt to tie down meaning,
to formulate a critical position is just not recognised as a legitimate
practice.
There is however a third and ironic
position, and that the irresponsible or 'cheated' use of deconstructive
method, by artists can actually point to a weakness within deconstructive
theory. That is that deconstructive theory is based upon certain criteria
which it will not and cannot admit to. To do deconstruction, to cheat at
it, to make the mechanisms too apparent, and the results too foregone,
is to expose certain assumptions that we harbour about the implicit politics
and ethics of deconstruction.
Deller, Scharlin and Borland each
seperately beg questions of deconstructive method.
They here represent three very different
interpretations of deconstructive method, which, respectively, could be
termed playful, illustrative and ethical.
Deller's works pushes the playfulness
of intertextuality to its limit, without making any grandiose claims to
its own importance. As Derrida is often portrayed as a joker, so too Deller's
work is challenging through its playfulness. This is both its success and
its limit. Perhaps deconstructive practice can go no further than to admit
to Deller's' form of tragi-comic humility. Deller's form of playful popular
deconstruction carries with it the nostalgia for the myths of creativity
that deconstruction itself tears down. By placing deconstruction within
popular culture he shows the ways in which deconstruction is a negative
force, a destroyer of cultural values, a leveller. His work in some way
measures the human cost of what is lost when we deconstruct our own culure.
Scherlin's work is at the forefront
of American deconstructive art, but is deconstruction gone text book. It
seems consciously constructed to illustrate deconstructive method, to even
teach the viewer 'how to do deconstruction'. Scherlin's work announces
deconstruction as an art methodology which illustrates theory, and goes
to great lengths to get it to get its message across (it is done professionally
and expensively--all scriptwriters and actresses were paid for their work
as 'makers' of her work). As such it is based upon a misreading; it does
not take deconstruction as a tool to, but as a message to be expressed.
As soon as deconstruction becomes 'the truth of our time' then it becomes
redundant. Her work shows the degree to which artists and critics have
come to accept deconstruction not as a tool, but as a set of truisms, almost
a belief system. If this is the case then Scharlins' work signals the demise
of decontruction as a critical tool, and the solidifying of deconstruction
into a form of liberal pluralism.
In pushing deconstruction into direct
confrontation with important ethical issues and 'cheating' with the viewer's
reading of the work Christine Borland is forcing us to question, the appropriateness
of deconstructive method in such contexts. It could be that by overstepping
the mark, by going into terrain where 'openness to interpretation' is not
enough, Borland has exposed the fact that there are certain boundaries
which deconstruction cannot cross, certain issues which it cannot address,
certain questions it cannot ask without completely undermining itself.
Ethical deconstruction? A contradiction in terms.
Notes
(1) Just be yourself . Logocentrism
and differance in performance theory. Philip Auslander.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Against Deconstruction John.M.Ellis.
(A text concerning the impact of deconstructive criticism on literary theory
in the USA.)
(4) The woman in possession Make
76. June July 97.
(5) David Barret. Review. Christine
Borland Lisson Gallery. Freize magazine. Issue 35.
(6) Against Deconstruction John
M. Ellis. |